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PRESUMED CONSENT FOR ORGAN DONATION: AN 
INCOHERENT JUSTIFICATION
Vicente Formoso1, Sílvia Marina2, Miguel Ricou3
Abstract: The difference between supply and demand of transplantable organs is a global problem, and one of the most dis-
cussed measures aiming to solve it is the implementation of a presumed consent (opt-out) policy in cadaveric organ donation. 
This type of system is controversial when it comes to its direct effects on organ donation rates as well as its ethical base. We aim to 
present the latest perspectives concerning the ethical implications of the policy, especially regarding consent: its need, the coher-
ence of presuming it and the policy’s capacity to fulfill its requirements. From a community perspective, we advocate a default 
change in societies with an opt-out system, with a strong population education in that direction. The potential rights of family 
objection are also approached as well as the differences between theoretical discussion and concrete application of public policy.  
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Presunción del consentimiento para la donación de órganos: una justificación incoherente
Resumen: El desfase entre la oferta y la demanda de órganos para trasplantes es un problema mundial, y una de las medidas 
más discutidas para solucionarlo es la aplicación de una política de consentimiento presumido (opt-out) de la donación 
de órganos de cadáveres. Este tipo de sistema es controvertido teniendo en cuenta sus efectos directos sobre las tasas de 
donación de órganos, así como su base ética. Nuestro objetivo es presentar las últimas perspectivas sobre las implicaciones 
éticas, especialmente en lo que respecta al consentimiento: su necesidad, la consistencia de su presunción y la capacidad de 
cumplir sus requisitos. Desde el punto de vista comunitario, abogamos por un cambio por defecto en las sociedades con un 
sistema de opt-out, con una fuerte educación de la población a tal efecto. También se abordan los posibles derechos de la 
objeción familiar, así como las diferencias entre el debate teórico y la aplicación concreta de las políticas públicas.
Palabras clave: presunción del consentimento, sistema opt-out, donación de órganos, post-mortem
Consentimento Presumido na Dação de Órgãos: Uma justificação incoerente
Resumo: A diferença entre a oferta e a procura de órgãos para transplantação é um problema global, e uma das medidas mais 
discutidas com vista à sua resolução é a implementação de uma política de consentimento presumido (opt-out) na doação de 
órgãos de cadáver. Este tipo de sistema é controverso ponderando os seus efeitos diretos nas taxas de doação de órgãos, bem 
como da sua base ética. O nosso objetivo é apresentar as últimas perspetivas relativas às implicações éticas, especialmente 
no que diz respeito ao consentimento: a sua necessidade, a coerência da sua presunção e a capacidade em cumprir os seus 
requisitos. Numa perspetiva comunitária, defendemos uma mudança de default nas sociedades com um sistema opt-out, 
com uma forte educação da população nesse sentido. Os direitos potenciais da objeção familiar também são abordados, bem 
como as diferenças entre a discussão teórica e a aplicação concreta da política pública.
Palavras chave: consentimento presumido, sistema opt-out, doação de órgãos, post-mortem
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donors. Therefore, more and more patients are 
piling up on a list that many believe underrepre-
sents the real need for organs(4). Patients who 
remain for a long time on the waiting list may 
become too weak to undergo significant surgery 
and may be excluded(5).
There are several approaches available to bridge 
this problematic gap between supply and de-
mand for organ donation. Despite the importan-
ce of attempting to reduce the demand for organ 
transplants(6), most of the debate is about incre-
asing supply. One specific measure that has been 
indicated in the literature as having an important 
role in increasing supply(7,8) is the implemen-
tation of a presumed consent policy on cadaver 
donation(2). Seventeen of the 35 Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
registered countries are classified as opt-out, and 
18 as opt-in(9).
There are different perspectives to consider the 
direct results of an opt-out policy on the num-
ber of post-mortem organ donations. However, 
most authors agree that donation rates are hig-
her in countries with opt-out legislation(10-12). 
Nevertheless, many authors argue that these 
results are not a direct consequence of the opt-
out policy, but the effect of other confounding 
factors(13). They contend that the change to an 
opt-out policy is usually just one of several mea-
sures to increase the availability of transplantable 
organs; this creates difficulties for those tasked 
with evaluating the legislation’s direct conse-
quences(11).
Instead of the influence of the opt-in or opt-out 
systems in the increasing organs donations, we 
discuss issues that arise from the policies inherent 
in a post-mortem organ donation. Particularly, 
we reflect on presumed consent in post-mortem 
organ transplantation bearing in mind the asso-
ciated ethical implications. A change in the type 
of consent is assumed.
Presumed consent or opt-out system
Respect for autonomy is a fundamental principle 
in medical care(4,14). The concept of choice and 
consent takes a central role in modern societies. 
Therefore, if personal decisions are voluntary and 
Introduction
The revolutionary technique of organ transplan-
tation appeared as an answer to a considerable 
and growing number of patients suffering from 
specific organ failures. This answer —as with all 
therapeutically innovative procedures— brought 
with it a set of questions, particularly from the 
ethics and legislative fields.
The discussion arises to consider not only the two 
usual perspectives —caregiver and patient— but 
also a new dimension: the donor. When conside-
ring the latter, the invasion of someone’s (his/her 
corpse’s) physical elements in such an extensive 
manner is justified mostly by the clinical benefit 
offered to others. At least in deceased donors. In 
living donors, we can say that the donor can get 
a psychological benefit from it.
This procedure uses two types of sources for trans-
ferable organic substrates: living and deceased 
donors. Concerning authorization and consent, 
the former can be asked about their willingness 
or not donate and discuss their concerns and mo-
tivations. The same cannot be said of the latter, 
hence the need to create specific regulations for 
deceased donors. In this last group, the decision 
and its respective statement will have to be made 
pre-mortem, so that if the individual becomes a 
potential donor, agents can proceed accordingly. 
There are two primary options for this regula-
tion: a) explicit consent/opt-in: only individuals 
that have officially registered their will to donate 
are considered acceptable post-mortem donors, 
b) presumed consent/opt-out: all individuals are 
considered acceptable donors after death unless 
they have officially registered their dissent(1). 
Nevertheless, a common misunderstanding 
is under the opt-in legislation. In the UK, for 
example, even when people have expressed their 
willingness to donate joining to the NHS Organ 
Donor Register, the families are asked for con-
sent, and their decision can prevail(2). Relatives 
of almost all brain-dead potential donors were 
approached about donation regardless if the per-
son was registered as an organ donor(3).
The increase in waiting lists for organ transplan-
tation is a global problem, with a growing need 
for organs and a deficient number of available 
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May consent be presumed?
In the literature, several authors even question 
the validity of the concept, asserting that consent 
consists of an action and not a mental attitude 
or decision and that one cannot presume that an 
action has taken place if one knows for a fact it 
has not(17-19).
An invasive procedure in a medical emergency 
with an unconscious patient is a situation gen-
erally understood to involve presumed consent. 
However, the medical staff may be presuming 
the patient in question would consent if he/she 
could do so, and the justification for such a pre-
sumption relies on acting in the patient’s best in-
terests(18). The same cannot be said about organ 
donation. It is not legitimate to assume that it 
was in the individual’s best interests to have his/
her organs removed(18). However, another au-
thor(20) argues for the importance of extended 
best interests in organ donation decisions, and 
this concept has been recognized in English law. 
The courts have made it clear that patients’ best 
interests are not just to receive what is medically 
indicated, but are also taking into account their 
social, moral, spiritual, and religious values(20). 
This law supports a broad approach to evaluate 
the best interest, and this principle also applies to 
those who would wish to be organ donors. 
We agree with Beauchamp and Childress(21) 
when they state about beneficence and non-
maleficence in medical care. They argue that 
the best interest of people should be linked with 
clinical dimensions alone. Moral, psychological, 
or other kind of benefits cannot be presumed be-
cause there are many differences between people.
Implicit/tacit consent
Instead of basing an opt-out system on the pre-
sumption of consent, it can be argued that we 
could base it on an implicit/tacit consent. When 
an individual fails to register an objection to con-
sent, he/she is giving an implied consent(22,18) 
if certain conditions are met: 1) the procedure 
associated to the consent must be a matter of 
general knowledge; 2) dissent registration must 
be practically effortless; 3) all information about 
the procedure and its consequences must be eas-
based on adequate information, they must be re-
spected; this is a system designed to contribute to 
the individual’s well-being(15).
Post-mortem organ donation presents a particu-
lar case in respecting personal autonomy because 
any decisions and eventual actions must be made 
pre-mortem.
People still have interests after they pass away. 
Respecting people’s decisions after death seems 
to be a socially desirable behavior(16). It is com-
mon to respect personal decisions after death 
about almost everything, including what to do 
with the body(17). Thus, the removal of organs 
without personal consent is considered wrong for 
the majority(4,6).
The core ethical discussion concerning this post-
mortem organ donation relies upon the shortage 
of transplantable organs and the concerns about 
respecting personal autonomy (16) It is doubtful 
whether adopting an opt-out policy as a way to 
increase organ donations is ethically acceptable.
The term “presumed consent” is often used as 
a synonym for an opt-out system; actually, it is 
hard to say they have the same meaning. “Pre-
sumed consent” in its purest and most basic 
meaning applies to organ donation as follows: it 
is presumed that someone consents the removal 
of your organs when, during their lifetime, they 
have not registered their dissent. Using this term 
as a synonym for an opt-out policy is not correct, 
as it is just an example of possible justification for 
this type of system.
The most practical component of an opt-out 
policy is that the default position becomes the 
removal of the individual’s organs. The person 
needs to make an official registration of dissent 
to avoid organ removal. The contrary happens 
under opt-in systems in which non-donation is 
the default procedure, and donation requires reg-
istration.
In the following section, the main topics of dis-
cussion concerning the adoption of an opt-out 
system will be approached, starting with the dis-
cussion of presumed consent itself as a possible 
jusfication for this type of policy.
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sent, and this is dogmatic for some authors. They 
claim that the only scenario in which it may 
be acceptable to remove an individual’s organs 
is when there is clear evidence that this was his/
her will, without space for speculations or as-
sumptions.
However, others assert that an opt-out policy can 
be justified based on a theory that rejects the very 
premise of the consent requirement, not based 
on any presumptions or inferences(26,27), but 
based on a concept of “normative consent.” Ac-
cording to this idea, it is wrong to refuse consent 
to something that it is morally right for the ma-
jority of the population. So, if it is wrong for a 
person to refuse to donate their cadaveric organs, 
their consent may not be necessary(27).
This concept would apply to an opt-out system. 
People do not have to register themselves as do-
nors, and there is room for people with strong 
anti-donation feelings. These latter people have 
the power to register their rejection and not be 
subjected to the intervention(26,28). Thus, the 
new premise is that donation is always permis-
sible unless the individual refuses. The refusal 
would have the power to change the prior sta-
tus quo. In this case, consent for transplantation 
would not be applicable(26).
It is argued that this concept justifies a policy 
of organ conscription —the indiscriminate pro-
curement of organs— unbalancing a suppos-
edly democratic system in favor of totalitarian-
ism(29). Its advocates disagree, stating that this 
system maintains voluntary status by allowing 
people the possibility to register as non-do-
nors(24) and preserving personal autonomy. Fi-
nally, an opt-out policy would have the objective 
of facilitating potential donations, not because 
of the subject’s consent, but because they do not 
object to it(5).
Individuality vs. community: easy rescue
The process of organ donation demands not 
only a discussion from the individual’s point of 
view but also a focus on the community. Trans-
plantation should be a community endeavor 
because it can only be achieved through organ 
donation(24). Several authors argue that post-
ily accessible(18). In these conditions, it will 
be more accurate, to justify an opt-out system, 
to name the consent as implicit instead as pre-
sumed. 
Nevertheless, different opinions arise regarding 
the mental attitude that underpins the action of 
consenting - in this case, implicitly. Some authors 
argue that if a consent procedure does not accu-
rately reflect the individual’s real opinion, will or 
rational decision; it can be considered immoral, 
similar to when one is using some manipulation 
to obtain something(22).
Other authors consider that if the individual 
does not register his/her objection, he/she is con-
senting regardless of his/her true feelings about 
the procedure. They argue that the mental atti-
tude or intention is irrelevant if he/she consents. 
There is no difference between this and someone 
who signs a consent form without intending to 
consent(19).
Although we agree that —in an ideal situation— 
implicit consent could determine with reason-
able accuracy, the exact will of the individual. It 
may be argued that, in truth, there is no way to 
understand the desires and opinions of others by 
anything apart from their actions(23).
Nevertheless, most of the authors believe that ap-
proval or willingness to donate is essential to the 
whole process(24). Some go even further, argu-
ing that an opt-in system is the only way to pro-
vide clear evidence that the person wanted and 
intended to donate(4,6). That is why some au-
thors disagree with the opt-out system. They be-
lieve it is not possible to accurately infer consent 
from inaction, since it may happen for different 
reasons, such as ignorance or inertia towards of-
ficial registration(25,26). Of course, an opt-in 
system may be subject to symmetric criticism. It 
is possible that not all citizens are aware of the 
possibility to donate, or they do not know how 
to register their intent, or they have inertia to act 
on it(17).
Is consent essential?
The accepted premise is that it is wrong to make 
post-mortem organ transplantation without con-
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or their family’s consent, even though they can 
also be considered to be a violation of the physi-
cal integrity of the corpse. Some authors argue 
that if an autopsy is ethically acceptable consid-
ering the individual’s rights and the community 
interests, it should be ethically acceptable to per-
form similar interventions when the principle at 
play is much more important: the preservation 
of life(33).
Defaults
The real difference that comes with a change of 
policy from opt-in to opt-out systems can be seen 
as changing the default position from non-dona-
tion to donation(18). It seems that the change in 
default could have several consequences.
In several contexts, one can say that inertia in-
terposes between the wishes of an individual, 
the act of making a decision and acting upon 
the decision(4,26). This affects donation rates in 
opt-in systems, in which they can be much lower 
than the reported will to donate(34). It is almost 
unanimously agreed that whichever policy is im-
plemented, it will inevitably be affected by this 
phenomenon(19).
It is a fact that default positions affect personal 
choices(34). In their decisions, people generally 
feel they need to have strong reason to deviate 
from the default stance; in cases of doubt, the 
default is chosen more often(17). The study of 
Davidai, Gilovich, and Ross(35) showed that dif-
ferent default positions changed the very mean-
ing people attached to being a donor, from being 
altruistic when they donate to just accomplish-
ing their moral obligation. Participation or non-
participation as donor depends mostly on the 
individual and the collective meaning that is as-
signed to the choice at hand. When the default 
is organ donation, the act seems like the natural 
choice everyone chooses unless some extraordi-
nary factor renders the individual reluctant to 
donate. When the default is not to donate, the 
act appears to be something noteworthy and ex-
ceptional, not something one would do without 
motive(17).
Some authors find the change of meaning that 
comes with a change in default status to be a neg-
mortem organ donation represents a situation of 
easy rescue since a person can save someone’s life 
(or at least enhance their quality of life) at little 
or no cost(26,27,30). For this reason, there is a 
duty to donate that some compare/contrast to a 
refusal to help someone in need(27). According 
to Snyder(31), a person must rescue others from 
harm if they can do it at little or no cost to them-
selves. The author calls to this proposal a duty of 
easy rescue, and state that a post-mortem organ 
transplantation qualifies as a case of easy rescue. 
Nevertheless, because there is a possibility that 
the moral significance of the action represents a 
high cost from the individual’s point of view (or 
even his/her family’s), he/she has the right to reg-
ister his/her objection at all times(26,28).
Other authors support an even closer connection 
between the individual and the community. In a 
democratic society facing such a severe problem, 
there may be justifications to limit some rights 
that may constrain cadaver donations in order to 
protect the potential recipients at risk(32). Fol-
lowing this line of thought, it can even seem jus-
tifiable to resort to a system in which the right 
to object would be dependent on the reason 
presented or even a situation in which there is 
no right for refusal. However, for practical and 
political reasons, it may seem better to allow any 
individual who feels this inclination —as well as 
the motivation to act upon it— the right to reg-
ister as a non-donor(30).
It is suggested —not as a justification but as a 
potential effect of the establishment of this pol-
icy— that knowledge regarding organ donation 
may help people understand how they can be au-
tonomous and at the same time invested in their 
community’s interests(30).
Regarding this notion of easy rescue: some au-
thors contend that it is currently advocated as a 
duty to provide necessary assistance in an emer-
gency, but its employment in such an invasive 
procedure would be going too far; treating “peo-
ple” as a means to an end and not as an end in it-
self(6). Even so, some authors suggest that we can 
compare post-mortem organ donation with an 
autopsy. In many countries, autopsies are often 
required by law, without the individual’s(18,33) 
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site cadaver operation— without consent. On 
the other hand, we have the right to decide on 
the organs’ use(22). Despite the consequences, 
some authors vehemently defend that action 
without consent would be more objectionable 
than inaction despite consent(16).
Family
An opt-in system may help assure families that 
the deceased wanted to donate his/her organs. In 
these cases, the patient’s intent is officially regis-
tered(22,24). On the other hand, an opt-out sys-
tem may allow greater protection for individuals 
who do not want to donate, since there is an offi-
cial registry of their desire, which could serve as a 
guide for uncertain family members(5,23). Con-
sulting the family during the decision process 
may be seen as a safeguard for either system(4).
According to a family’s viewpoint, a presumed 
consent may not be considered the best justifica-
tion for the removal of a loved one’s organs. The 
families seem to consider that a passive choice 
has been made, so their opposition is more jus-
tified. The perception that relatives have about 
the deceased’s wishes about organ donation is 
thought to be the strongest predictor of a fam-
ily’s decision(39,40). If the default position is to 
donate organs, the acceptance of this stance by 
the family will probably be higher.
Should a family’s opposition to organ donation 
prevent the procedure? In the first place, it should 
be difficult for families to make a decision facing 
the inherent emotional problems associated with 
the love being lost(32). However, families usually 
know what action is in the patient’s best interest 
because they usually know him/her better than 
the medical team. If the patient’s decision is of-
ficially registered, it would be more difficult to 
justify any deviation from the patient’s written 
opinion even, as we stated before, this is possible 
in the UK, for example(2,3).
However, organ removal against the will of the 
family can damage the doctor-patient-family re-
lationship(4). Nevertheless, giving the families 
the final decision is equivalent to the devaluation 
of the deceased’s decisions(5,6,14) and contra-
dicts the respect for individual freedom(24).
ative consequence. In their opinion, an opt-out 
system turns the act of donation into a default 
position rather than a selfless act of solidarity(34) 
or a voluntary gift(4), depriving it of its altruistic 
meaning. They even argue that some recipients 
find it easier to accept the organs if they know 
they were voluntarily given(4). Others oppose 
this perspective, stating that the main objective 
should be to save lives rather than make people 
feel good about donating(5); the principal val-
ue of the donation is instrumental, not expres-
sive(19). Besides, making the morally correct 
process easier does not invalidate or diminish its 
significant value(19).
Specifically arguing in favor of an opt-out system, 
several authors believe that the choice considered 
to be morally correct should be the default, leav-
ing the burden of registration to people oppos-
ing it(17,19,23). From the community’s point of 
view, some say that one positive change possibly 
brought about by an opt-out system would be a 
change in mentality. It could promote an under-
standing that this should be the expected behav-
ior of any citizen(36) while underlining the value 
of community involvement towards the com-
mon good(30). A change in this direction may 
represent the establishment of a new perspective, 
facing donation as an acceptable and natural part 
of dying(10).
Is the removal of organs from people who do 
not agree worse than non-donation of the peo-
ple who do agree?
Whatever the policy in place, opt-in or opt-out, 
there is no doubt there will be mistakes(17,22). 
By leaving the burden of registration to those 
who dissent, there is a risk that some people will 
have their organs removed against their will be-
cause they never registered their opinion(37). 
However, using an opt-in policy would cause 
some willing donors’ organs to be unused for the 
same reason(17). Can one say that the compro-
mise of the right to self-determination is higher 
in the first than in the second case(5)?
In this case, the severity of each fault must be 
compared with consideration to the two differ-
ent rights’ values. On the one hand, we have the 
right to refuse organ donation —and the requi-
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In this context, we consider that a change of the 
default would be justifiable, rather than a pre-
sumed or implicit consent. Instead of being pre-
sumed based on inaction, it could be assumed 
that, given the reduced cost and the social benefit 
provoked, the norm would be to donate. Any-
one who legitimately did not agree would have 
to make an effort to register as a non-donor. A 
default change is only possible if a majority of 
people agree with a donation. 
The role of the family should be considered in a 
system like this to decrease the potential for unfair 
decisions that are inherent in any decision-mak-
ing process. We argue that in an opt-out system, 
where the default would be organ donation, the 
family’s opinion should be considered unless the 
person is registered as a non-donor. The purpose 
of the default change would be to promote the 
idea that we would all be donors after death. Of 
course, there remains the possibility of someone 
being against this change of premise and lacking 
the information to avoid it(28). However, this 
probability will likely be lower in a society where 
the default stance is organ donation. When the 
majority of people agree with an idea, those who 
disagree usually search for more information in 
order to develop stronger arguments and convic-
tions. The family opinion should be considered 
in these situations to reduce the probability of 
injustices. Organ donation should be avoided if 
the family is unanimously against it.
The main reason for defending this idea is that 
we agree it will always be better to give organs 
than not to give them. However, we respect each 
other’s beliefs and convictions, and we under-
stand that the cost of giving organs would be too 
high for some people. Based on the belief that 
most people will agree with post-mortem dona-
tion, we advocate for societies with a current opt-
out system to change the default and initiate a 
campaign of education and information for their 
population regarding this paradigm change. Giv-
ing organs after death can be valuable to society. 
Nonetheless, it should be clear that anyone who 
disagrees will be respected in their non-donation 
decision, regardless of their motivation. We need 
to understand if this default stance in an opt-out 
system impacts levels of non-donor registration. 
If so, it would be a sign that this option is more 
Despite these concerns, it may be unreasonable 
to consider a system that does not include fami-
lies. It can be essential to avoid public discom-
fort(14) towards the donation program or even 
the national health system. Besides the inherent 
importance of the family’s feelings(14), their 
support is also essential for providing informa-
tion about the deceased that may be relevant to 
the procedures(4).
Final considerations
The literature detailing the effects of implement-
ing an opt-out system suggests that there is a 
positive effect on donation rates, but it is dif-
ficult to establish causality(11,12). In turn, the 
implementation of this type of system creates 
complexities. The argument traditionally raised 
is that there is a presumed consent if the person 
has not been registered in the national register 
of non-donors. It is argued that the majority of 
people would agree to the organ donation, even 
if they do not take the initiative to register as or-
gan donor due to lax attitudes regarding the sub-
ject or by not wanting to prepare for the moment 
of their death. The literature does not support 
this argument. Logically, there is not much sense 
in maintaining a default position of non-organ 
donation if most people would agree to give their 
organs post-mortem. This apparent contradic-
tion is justified through the presumed consent, 
which is not reinforced by the literature.
Presumed consent has been associated with an 
opt-out system, assuming that a person consented 
to the removal of their organs if, in life, he/she did 
not register their dissent. In our opinion, and the 
same line of reasoning as other authors(17,18), 
there remains an incoherence in presuming an 
action that we know has not occurred. Presump-
tion of consent is generally accepted for an inva-
sive procedure in a medical emergency where the 
patient is unable to consent, thus allowing an ac-
tion for the best interests of the patient(18). The 
same cannot be said about organ donation since 
it is not done in the best clinical interest of the 
patient. Moreover, consent cannot be accurately 
inferred through inaction; this may be due to a 
lack of information or inertia regarding official 
registration(4,5,25).
34 
Presumed Consent for Organ Donation: An Incoherent Justification - Vicente Formoso, Sílvia Marina, Miguel Ricou
Acknowledgements
This article was supported by FCT - Fundação para 
a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within CINTESIS, 
Unidad de I+D (referencia UIDB/4255/2020).
valid for increasing the number of donors (in 
comparison with an opt-in system) and is fairer 
to those who do not want to be organ donors. 
We believe this can promote greater social justice 
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